On Disagreement. Part 2

Here's a pretty dull picture of a dress with gold and white stripes, right? As you probably know, this past February, a tumblr user posted this photo and it went viral. Why? Because of disagreement.

If, like me, you saw gold/white stripes, then you were rational to believe that the stripes actually are gold/white. But what are you rational to believe when you realize that a huge population of people disagree with you? While looking at the same picture, they see black and blue stripes. How does your awareness of that disagreement influence the rationality of your original belief?

It turns out that the dress in the photo has been identified, so evidence that will settle the question exists. However, while one is aware of the genuine disagreement and before one is aware of what that definitive evidence shows, we can and should ask the following questions:

- Are those who see gold/white stripes rational in continuing to believe that the stripes are gold/white?

- Are those who see black/blue stripes rational in continuing to believe that the stripes are black/blue?

- Or should both camps suspend belief and conclude that there is something fishy about this situation - something that's preventing either group from rationally forming a belief about the actual colors of the stripes?

It seems to me that just as the disagreeing clocks in my previous post prevent rational belief regarding the actual time, so does the disagreement that captivated the world-wide-web prevent rational belief regarding the actual colors of the stripes on the dress. Until further evidence is available to settle the question, anybody who insists that the dress stripes actually are as they appear to them in the face of that disagreement is just special pleading.

The definition of arrogance is displaying a sense of superiority, self-importance, or entitlement. Without a reason for one group to think that their perception of the dress colors is more likely to be correct than the other, any member of each group who is aware of the genuine disagreement that exists, yet who insists that the colors actually are as they appear, is being arrogant. The humble thing to do here is the epistemically right thing to do, and that is to recognize that one simply can't rationally believe that the dress colors are as they appear. Not, at least, until further evidence settles the issue. The rational thing to do here is to remain agnostic on the question, despite the deliverance of your senses.

Let me explain. Assent to a belief is only rational when it is more likely that the belief is true than false. Since there is no reason to think that one group is more likely than the other to have true beliefs about the dress stripes, the principle of insufficient reason (also known as the principle of indifference) suggests that the probability that either group is correct is no better than 0.5 (after all, both groups could be wrong). Accordingly, the genuine disagreement in this case prevents rational belief. Again, the rational thing to do is to remain agnostic about the dress. One could humbly say that one's best guess is that the colors are as they appear to them, but one would not be rational to say that they believe that the dress colors actually are as they appear.

What if someone perceiving the colors as white/gold were to think to themselves something like this: "Maybe those people seeing black/blue stripes have something wrong with their visual systems? Maybe they are falling prey to an illusion? Accordingly, I can rationally continue to believe that I'm right and they are wrong." Would this kind of argumentation provide a good reason for rationally maintaining the belief that the dress colors actually are white/gold?

Well, if those seeing black/blue stripes are falling prey to a visual illusion, then those seeing white/gold stripes are rational to continue to hold their belief that the stripes are white/gold, but the disagreement calls that very conditional into question! Assuming that the other group is the one falling prey to a visual illusion is a classic case of begging the question (also known as circular reasoning). To avoid this fallacy, one would have to not be assuming that the other group is likely to be wrong; that is, one would need to have reason(s) independent of the disagreement itself to believe that the other group is likely to be wrong.

I've now considered two instances of disagreement: (a) quartz clocks displaying different times, and (b) two large groups of people disagreeing about the colors of a dress in a photo. In both instances, there was no good reason to think that one clock, or one group, was more likely to be correct than the other, and in both instances, assent to belief was irrational, or so I have argued.

Next time, I'll try to summarize what I think are the logical principles involved in considering how disagreement should affect the rationality of one's belief(s). This is the time to chime in if you think that I've made some mistake in my reasoning so far. This is your time to disagree.

By the way, here's a picture of the actual dress in the photo:

And here's a link to a great discussion of the explanation for this disagreement by Canadian experimental psychologist and cognitive scientist, Dr. Stephen Pinker.

The Long Reach of Reason

One of the main messages I wish to endorse and defend here at Skepsis in a delightful Socratic dialogue between Rebecca Newberger Goldstein and Canada's own Steven Pinker. 

I cannot compete with these thinkers, so if there's one thing in which you indulge at this blog, make it this TED talk. 

A few things I've learned about psychological gender differences and feminism

Queen Bey

In the outrage that followed some remarks made by author, Sam Harris, earlier this month, I set out to better understand what we know about psychological gender differences. When it became clear to me that there was very reasonable (though admittedly, not perfect) evidence that men tend to be more aggressive and women tend to be more nurturing, I suggested that the charges of sexism that many, including U of C Freethinker , HJ Hornbeck, were advancing and defending on social media just couldn’t stick. I gave Hornbeck a chance to defend his accusation here on Skepsis, and he took that opportunity to level two more charges of sexism against Harris. Hornbeck thought he did well enough defending himself that he did not retract his charges or apologize for any of them. I’m grateful that he did engage me and the evidence, and I'm happy to let you, my readers, look over all of our exchanges here and here and make up your own minds about whether Harris' comments were, in fact, sexist.

Now that the dust has settled, I thought it might be of interest to see just where the literature stands regarding gender differences. Thankfully, perhaps the foremost authority on the topic, Dr. Janet S. Hyde, published a thorough review just this year. Hyde is recognized as having coined the “gender similarities hypothesis”. Her 2005 meta-analysis of meta-analyses showed that, contrary to the popular opinion that men are from mars and women are from venus, the genders are much more similar than they are different. Here’s what she recently had to say among her concluding remarks:

“Overall, based on the numerous meta-analyses reported here, there is much evidence in support of the gender similarities hypothesis. Domains in which gender differences are small (around d = 0.20) or trivial (d ≤ 0.10) include mathematics performance, verbal skills, some personality dimensions such as gregariousness and conscientiousness, reward sensitivity, the temperament dimension of negative affectivity, relational aggression, tentative speech, some aspects of sexuality (e.g., oral sex experience, attitudes about extramarital sex, attitudes about masturbation), leadership effectiveness, self-esteem, and academic self-concept.

Nonetheless, the gender similarities hypothesis acknowledges exceptions to the general rule. Exceptions to gender similarities, where differences are moderate (d = 0.50) or large (d = 0.80), include 3D mental rotation, the personality dimension of agreeableness/tender-mindedness, sensation seeking, interests in things versus people, physical aggression, some sexual behaviors (masturbation and pornography use), and attitudes about casual sex.

 This review also reveals much evidence of the importance of context in creating or erasing gender differences. For example, deindividuation, which removes the influence of gender roles, erases the gender difference in aggression.”- Janet S. Hyde PhD, 2014 (bold emphasis is mine)

The first thing to note is that though similarities outnumber differences, there are some exceptions and they include an at least moderate difference in agreeableness/tendermindedness, which is the term used in this research that entails nurturing. This is precisely what Dr. Yanna Weisberg, whose 2011 work I referenced in my last entry, described and concluded. A moderate difference means that about 75% of women will rank above the mean agreeableness of men, and that there is a 2 out of 3 chance that a random female will exceed the agreeableness of a random male.

The situation with aggression, where moderate-large differences have been identified, is interesting, and Hornbeck pointed it out during our exchange. In one experiment, when gender identity was concealed, the difference in aggression disappeared, suggesting that socialized gender roles were involved in whatever differences existed, rather than underlying biology. While I suspect that this finding is not the last word on the subject, I am grateful to Hornbeck for bringing it to the table for discussion. Notice that it doesn’t suggest that women aren’t less aggressive in the specific context addressed by Harris’ comments where gender identity is out in the open (except for sometimes on the internet), or more importantly, that certain open contexts that select for aggression and against agreeableness might produce fairly large gender predominances. Furthermore Harris’ hypothesis doesn’t rely on the gender difference in aggression being biological as opposed to sociocultural, so while Hornbeck’s point here is interesting and true, it can’t rescue him.

Hornbeck is like many others who called Harris' comments and blog entry sexist in that many of these folks don't really seem to buy into there being any relevant psychological gender differences, so anybody who disagrees with them must be sexist, by definition.

Notice one of the bizarre and unwanted consequences of that position. If the claim of relevant psychological gender differences itself, is sexist, then Drs. Janet Hyde and Yanna Weisberg et al, who concluded in their research that some moderate and even large gender differences do exist, must be accused of sexism, too.

Should people doing science and drawing honest conclusions about data on psychological gender differences have to fear charges of sexism from those who think that such conclusions are unwarranted? Should Therese Huston (cognitive psychologist at Seattle University), Mara Mather (cognitive neuroscientist at University of Southern California), Nicole R. Lighthall (cognitive neuroscientists at Duke University), Stephanie D. Preston (cognitive scientist at University of Michigan), Ruud van den Bos (Neurobiologist at Radbound University in the Netherlands), Livia Tomova and Claus Lamm (University of Vienna) all close shop and jettison these questions, or should their work related to gender differences in decision making under stress be openly available is it was in the NY Times last week?

Shouldn’t we have an open conversation on this subject without having one jumping to conclusions about people’s reasoning, and dropping ugly accusations of sexism at every turn whenever others disagree with one about the state of the evidence? Why not just stick to a conversation about the evidence, without resorting to indirect (aka relational) aggression against individuals?

I’m going to let Harvard psychologist, Steven Pinker, have the last word on this one:

“The psychology of taboo is not completely irrational. In maintaining our most precious relationships, it is not enough to say and do the right thing. We have to show that our heart is in the right place and that we don't weigh the costs and benefits of selling out those who trust us. If someone offers to buy your child or your spouse or your vote, the appropriate response is not to think it over or to ask how much. The appropriate response is to refuse even to consider the possibility. Anything less emphatic would betray the awful truth that you don't understand what it means to be a genuine parent or spouse or citizen. (The logic of taboo underlies the horrific fascination of plots whose protagonists are agonized by unthinkable thoughts, such as Indecent Proposal and Sophie's Choice.) Sacred and tabooed beliefs also work as membership badges in coalitions. To believe something with a perfect faith, to be incapable of apostasy, is a sign of fidelity to the group and loyalty to the cause. Unfortunately, the psychology of taboo is incompatible with the ideal of scholarship, which is that any idea is worth thinking about, if only to determine whether it is wrong.

At some point in the history of the modern women's movement, the belief that men and women are psychologically indistinguishable became sacred. The reasons are understandable: Women really had been held back by bogus claims of essential differences. Now anyone who so much as raises the question of innate sex differences is seen as "not getting it" when it comes to equality between the sexes. The tragedy is that this mentality of taboo needlessly puts a laudable cause on a collision course with the findings of science and the spirit of free inquiry.”- Steven Pinker, 2005