I’ve
been blogging about Alvin Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (EAAN)
over the past few weeks. The original plan was to (1) explain the argument, (2) suggest
that it wasn’t that devastating to naturalists if a humble idea of ‘truth’ was adopted, (3) show
that Plantinga’s theistic beliefs don’t give him any better epistemic foundation than a naturalistic one, and finally, (4) to refute the first
premise, without which, the argument fails. Steps
1-3 have been accomplished, and while I’ve been trying hard to accomplish step
4, I'm not confident that I or anybody else has been able to clearly and convincingly succeed. Philosopher, Stephen Law, believes he has, but I must admit that I don't understand his response to the EAAN well enough to explain it here. I'm waiting for him to provide a dumbed-down version for lay people like me to understand. In the meantime, though, I'm forced to consider that Plantinga may well be right about
premise 1: on naturalism and evolution, the probability that our cognitive
faculties are reliable probably is low. I actually want to thank Plantinga for
reminding me of this prediction for it seems to me that things turn out looking very much as Plantinga would expect. This, I believe, provides even more
evidence for naturalism and evolution and makes Christian theism even harder to
accept. But before I get to that, there is one way that the first premise could
very well turn out to be false.
If beliefs don’t affect behavior (epiphenomenalism), or they affect behavior but not by virtue of their content (semantic epiphenomenalism), then it is hard to see how evolution could select for mechanisms that produce True* beliefs, for evolution would seem to be blind to belief content just as Plantinga has suggested. However, if beliefs do affect behavior by virtue of their contents, then Plantinga’s crucial first premise is very likely false. As Plantinga himself has said:
If beliefs don’t affect behavior (epiphenomenalism), or they affect behavior but not by virtue of their content (semantic epiphenomenalism), then it is hard to see how evolution could select for mechanisms that produce True* beliefs, for evolution would seem to be blind to belief content just as Plantinga has suggested. However, if beliefs do affect behavior by virtue of their contents, then Plantinga’s crucial first premise is very likely false. As Plantinga himself has said:
"Now
if content of belief did enter the causal chain that leads to
behavior--and if true belief caused adaptive behavior (and false belief
maladaptive behavior)--then natural selection, by rewarding and punishing
adaptive and maladaptive behavior respectively, could shape the mechanisms that
produce belief in the direction of greater reliability. There could then be
selection pressure for true belief and for reliable belief-producing mechanisms." (Naturalism Defeated? p. 257)
It is
probably the case that the naturalist lacks a robust explanation for how
immaterial beliefs could cause behaviour, but that doesn't mean that there
isn't one and it's not at all clear to me that the naturalist must be wedded to the idea that it's impossible. There is a long history attesting to the outstanding success of
methodological naturalism (ie. science) in filling gaps in our knowledge and
imagination - gaps previously filled by God or gods - with natural explanations. Plantinga likes to fill this particular explanatory gap with his
God but there are problems with doing so that I have explained here, and I see
no reason for the naturalist to also have to do so. If Plantinga disagrees,
then I’d have to ask why he isn't correspondingly required to explain how it is
that God himself tracks Truth*? I mean, how does he know, and even deeper, how
does He know?
Ok. let's move on and see if the EAAN actually places a burden on Plantinga himself. Paraphrasing Plantinga: on naturalism and
(therefore, unguided) evolution, the probability that a given belief will be
true is 0.5. Accordingly, if someone has 100 independent beliefs, the
probability that most of them, say, 75% of them, are true is going to be less
than one in a million.
Now
consider Harry the homo sapien living on the African Savannah 150,000 years
ago. I suspect that Plantinga is correct in suggesting that the
chance that the vast majority of his beliefs are going to be true is <<
1/1,000,000.
Plantinga does think that our sensory organs could evolve naturally to reliably indicate certain environmental states of affairs, so some of Harry’s beliefs could also be true in some ways. For instance, Harry may believe that a green tree is in front of him and that he had better run around it or risk serious injury. Is his belief that the tree is green True? The tree merely absorbs all wavelengths of light except green. It reflects green wavelengths which are then detected by the indicators in his retina, leading to a belief that the tree is green, but the only thing that is green is his mental representation of the tree. Nevertheless, his idea that there is something in front of him and that colliding with it will cause injury surely is true. Does it matter that the tree isn’t really green but that his mental representation of it is? Evolution doesn’t seem to care about it so long as Harry sees the tree and avoids injury. Should we really care? That’s just how we experience certain truths about our environment. As I argued in part 2 of this series, that’s just truth to us.
Plantinga does think that our sensory organs could evolve naturally to reliably indicate certain environmental states of affairs, so some of Harry’s beliefs could also be true in some ways. For instance, Harry may believe that a green tree is in front of him and that he had better run around it or risk serious injury. Is his belief that the tree is green True? The tree merely absorbs all wavelengths of light except green. It reflects green wavelengths which are then detected by the indicators in his retina, leading to a belief that the tree is green, but the only thing that is green is his mental representation of the tree. Nevertheless, his idea that there is something in front of him and that colliding with it will cause injury surely is true. Does it matter that the tree isn’t really green but that his mental representation of it is? Evolution doesn’t seem to care about it so long as Harry sees the tree and avoids injury. Should we really care? That’s just how we experience certain truths about our environment. As I argued in part 2 of this series, that’s just truth to us.
So while
most of Harry’s beliefs surely are false in a variety of possible ways, some
are likely to be True and those that are likely to be True are the ones most likely to be derived from
reliable indicators as Plantinga likes to call them, otherwise known as our senses.
Now imagine what can happen when Harry and his colleagues can communicate and
share their beliefs with tens, hundreds, thousands, and eventually billions of
other people. And imagine what can happen when we realize, as a species, that
the beliefs most likely to be True (or the ones with the most True content
associated with them) are the ones that we can test against our environment.
Imagine what can happen when that process shows us how poor many of our cognitive
capabilities actually are and that we can begin to correct for those
inadequacies. Plantinga is probably correct that the
majority of Harry’s beliefs will be false, but thanks to science our species has
developed ways of obtaining and sharing ideas that go far beyond anything
evolution could have cooked up for Harry. As Sam Harris has pointed out, we’ve
flown the perch built for us by evolution, and it’s far from clear to me that a
modern day person, well educated in science and skepticism needs to worry too
much more about her beliefs being false because of the EAAN. Anybody with a modicum
of epistemic sophistication is already a humble fallibilist. She already looks to
the best sources for justification that we can hope for: those delivered by
science. A reliance on science is really an admission that our cognitive
faculties suck and that to find Truth we have to follow a rigorous methodology
that’s about correcting for sources of error and bias both within and outside
of us and even then, we'll very often end up with adaptive models of Truth that we call truth.
So really, it
is not naturalism that has troubles explaining the reliability of our
faculties: it's theism. Cognitively, we seem to be pretty good at the kinds of
things that require us to survive and successfully reproduce like avoiding
predators, caring for our offspring, obtaining food, etc. However, as a
species, our members are horrible at understanding physics, advanced
mathematics, statistics, probability, chaotic (but fully deterministic)
systems, etc. Getting good requires many years of advanced education and hard
work; it certainly doesn’t come naturally. This would seem to be precisely the
case expected on unguided evolution. So it seems to me that there is a burden on Plantinga to explain how our lousy cognitive processes are reflective of the notion that an allegedly perfect being created us in his image. Are we to believe that God is also subject to a plethora of deeply problematic cognitive biases and
perceptual and memory errors? Could Satan plant false memories into the mind of
God as certain psychologists have done to people, for example? Does God also
condemn people to (eternal) punishment on the basis of shoddy eye-witness
testimony?
The
question of the conditional probability of reliable cognitive faculties is just
too blunt for such a complicated topic. If none of our cognitive
faculties are reliable, then I will admit that our search for Truth is
hopeless. But if some of our faculties are reliable some of the time, then by
cooperating and communicating and finding ways to avoid our cognitive
weaknesses, I don’t see why we can’t build up from a humble foundation creating models of truth that get closer and closer to the Truth, and that, it seems, is precisely the
situation I think we find ourselves in. Plantinga’s EAAN is interesting but at
the end of the day, it changes little, if not nothing for me. I’m still very
much a naturalist who firmly believes in the truth of evolution, and I’ll keep
following the deliverances of empiricism over pure rationality. This, it seems to me, is an epistemically challenging and responsible stance, while making the whole matter go away by simply asserting that “Goddidit” ... well, you can decide for yourself what you think of that.
* In this 4 part series, I use lower case t 'truth' to denote what seems true to us and capital T 'Truth" for what's actually or ultimately true. More on this here.
* In this 4 part series, I use lower case t 'truth' to denote what seems true to us and capital T 'Truth" for what's actually or ultimately true. More on this here.